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Abstract. Diversity can significantly increase the resilience of systems,
by reducing the prevalence of shared vulnerabilities and making vulnera-
bilities harder to exploit. Work on software diversity for security typically
creates variants of a program using low-level code transformations. This
paper is the first to study algorithm diversity for resilience. We first de-
scribe how a method based on high-level invariants and systematic incre-
mentalization can be used to create algorithm variants. Executingmultiple
variants in parallel and comparing their outputs provides greater resilience
than executing one variant. To prevent different parallel schedules from
causing variants’ behaviors to diverge, we present a synchronized execu-
tion algorithm for DistAlgo, an extension of Python for high-level, precise,
executable specifications of distributed algorithms. We propose static and
dynamic metrics for measuring diversity. An experimental evaluation of
algorithm diversity combined with implementation-level diversity for sev-
eral sequential algorithms and distributed algorithms shows the benefits
of algorithm diversity.
1 Introduction
Diversity can significantly increase the resilience of systems, by reducing the preva-
lence of shared vulnerabilities and making vulnerabilities harder to exploit. The
idea of intentionally introducing software diversity as a defense mechanism has
been around for decades, e.g., [5,6]. It is closely related to the well-knownmoving
target defense (MTD) strategy: running different variants of a program at differ-
ent times is MTD. Software diversity is an effective defense against attacks whose
success depends on details of the victim software. Without knowing those details
for the specific instance (variant) of the software being attacked, attackers can still
attempt such attacks (e.g., by making random guesses at those details), but the
probability of success is greatly reduced [16].
There is a large corpus of research on techniques for automatically introducing
software diversity that increase resilience to various classes of attacks [16]. For
example, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), which randomizes the
starting addresses of segments in a process’s address space, is a classic form of
software diversity that increases resilience to some types of memory corruption
attacks.
Themost commonway to use software diversity to increase resilience is to run a
randomly selected variant each time the program is executed. With this approach,
2the use of diversity alters, with high probability, the effect of an attack, so the
attack does not have the intended effect (e.g., gaining root privilege and installing
a rootkit) [16]. The attack might still have a less malicious and less predictable
but nevertheless undesirable effect (e.g., crash or incorrect output).
Another way is to run multiple variants of the application in parallel and
compare their outputs. We call this diversified replication. Any difference in the
outputs of the variants indicates misbehavior of one or more variants due to an
attack; this triggers defensive action. This approach provides greater resilience,
at the cost of more computational resources. It also provides greater resilience
than traditional replication, in which replicas are identical and exhibit the same
(incorrect) behavior when their vulnerabilities are exploited. Note that diversity
may lead to different behavior (and therefore attack detection) in two ways: (1) it
might cause a difference in the direct effect of the attack (e.g., which data struc-
ture is overwritten) or, (2) even if the direct effect of the attack is the same (e.g.,
the same data structure is overwritten), it might cause differences in subsequent
behavior, due to differences in the algorithms or implementations used by the vari-
ants (e.g., one variant reads the affected data structure earlier in its computation
and hence before the attack, and another reads the affected data structure later
in its computation and hence after the attack).
This paper focuses on algorithm diversity for software resilience, in which dif-
ferent variants run different algorithms, i.e., perform different computations at a
high level. In contrast, all of the work surveyed in [16] creates implementation-level
diversity, changing details of the implementation without changing the algorithm.
Algorithm diversity can introduce new and larger differences between variants
than implementation-level diversity and hence can provide greater resilience, es-
pecially when used together with implementation-level diversity.
Algorithm variants may be obtained in a variety of ways, besides writing them
manually. For standard problems (e.g., dictionary ADT), they can be obtained
from algorithm libraries. A more general automated approach is to generate them
by starting with a high-level algorithm (or specification) and applying different
optimizations (algorithm improvements, automated using program analysis and
transformation). In particular, we have used a method based on systematic in-
crementalization [27,22,19,18], which transforms programs to maintain high-level
invariants incrementally, and related optimizations to generate multiple variants
of many sequential algorithms and distributed algorithms [26,25,24].
Algorithm diversity and implementation-level diversity introduce different
kinds of variation and together offer more diversity than either alone. We in-
troduce diversity metrics that quantify the difference between—or equivalently,
the similarity of—variants. We consider a static metric, code diversity, based on
the instruction sequences in the compiled program, and two dynamic (behavioral)
metrics: trace diversity, based on the sequence of instructions executed, and input
access diversity, based on the sequence of accesses to input data. The latter dy-
namic metric is motivated by the fact that invalid inputs are the primary attack
vector for external attackers. A direction for future work is to augment these broad
3diversity metrics with more specialized metrics that quantify resilience to specific
classes of attacks.
Algorithm diversity can be applied to programs in any language. In this paper,
we focus on Python and DistAlgo [25,24], an extension of Python for high-level,
precise, executable specifications of distributed algorithms. In contrast, existing
work on automated software diversity primarily targets C programs or (disassem-
bled) machine code.
Python is interpreted—more precisely, CPython, the predominant implemen-
tation of Python, compiles Python to bytecode and then runs the bytecode in
an interpreter. Algorithm diversity applied to Python programs can be used to-
gether with implementation-level diversity applied to Python programs and the
runtime system. This achieves greater total diversity and increases resilience to
vulnerabilities in the runtime system, because vulnerabilities manifest only with
specific inputs, and the runtime system’s inputs include Python programs as well
as network messages, UI events, etc. Diversity at the high-level language level
provides additional protection from data-only attacks [4,30], against which many
runtime-system-level defenses are less effective. Algorithm diversity applied to
Python programs can also provide resilience to functional faults in the runtime
system, if the runtime system does not correctly implement the semantics of some
built-in constructs or library functions in some (corner) cases.
Diversified replication requires synchronized execution (often calledN -version
execution [1]) of the variants; otherwise, their executions might diverge due to
scheduling differences. Synchronized execution of distributed programs generally
requires synchronization of message delivery order. DistAlgo’s asynchronousmes-
sage handling requires additional synchronization, to ensure that all variants han-
dle corresponding messages at corresponding points in their executions. We de-
veloped a synchronized execution framework for DistAlgo that ensures this. Our
framework can also suppport variants whose behaviors differ in prescribed ways.
Measuring dynamic diversity for Python and DistAlgo programs required de-
velopment of new runtime monitoring tools, which are also more broadly useful.
We designed and implemented a tool that intercepts accesses to fields of selected
objects; we use it to log accesses to objects read as input, including objects re-
ceived in messages. Handling built-in types such as integers and strings is tricky,
because they are sometimes accessed directly by C code in the Python interpreter,
but essential, because they are commonly used in program inputs.
We also designed and implemented a tracing tool that reconstructs the ex-
act sequence of bytecode instructions executed by a Python program. It uses the
standard Python tracing module to record the sequence of source lines executed,
and then analyzes the compiled program to determine the sequence of bytecode
instructions corresponding to each source line. Supporting DistAlgo requires some
extra work, due to details of DistAlgo’s implementation by translation to Python.
In summary, the contributions of this paper include:
– The first study of semi-automated algorithm diversity for software resilience,
using a method based on systematic incrementalization to generate algorithm
variants.
4– A synchronized execution framework for DistAlgo and for high-level exe-
cutable specifications of distributed algorithms.
– Static and dynamic metrics for measuring diversity.
– A runtime monitoring tool for Python andDistAlgo that logs accesses to fields
of selected objects, including instances of built-in types.
– A tracing tool for Python and DistAlgo that reconstructs the exact sequence
of executed bytecode instructions.
– Experimental evaluation of algorithmdiversity combinedwith implementation-
level diversity for several sequential algorithms and distributed algorithms,
demonstrating that algorithmdiversity can achievemore diversity than implementation-
level diversity, and the two together can achieve even more.
2 Background on DistAlgo
Liu et al. [25,24] propose DistAlgo, a language for high-level, precise, executable
specifications of distributed algorithms, and study its use for specification, imple-
mentation, optimization, and simplification of such algorithms. For expressing dis-
tributed algorithms at a high level, DistAlgo supports fourmain concepts by build-
ing on an object-oriented programming language, Python: (1) distributed pro-
cesses that sendmessages, (2) control flow for handling receivedmessages, (3) high-
level queries for synchronization conditions, and (4) configuration for setting up
and running. DistAlgo is specified precisely by a formal operational semantics [24].
Processes That Send Messages. A process type P is defined by a class definition
for P that inherits from DistAlgo’s built-in process class. The definition of P may
contain, in addition to the usual definitions that may appear in Python classes,
definition of a setup method for taking in and setting up the values used by the
process, definition of a runmethod containing the main control flow of the process,
and definitions of receive handlers for handling messages, as described below.
To create instances ofP , DistAlgo provides a new P construct; it can optionally
be preceded by the number of processes to create (the default is 1) and followed by
“at h” where h identifies the host where the process(es) should be created (the de-
fault is the local host). After a new process has been created, and its setupmethod
called to initialize it, invoking its startmethod causes execution of its runmethod.
Processes send messages using the statement send m to ps, where ps is a pro-
cess or set of processes.
Control Flow for Handling Received Messages. Received messages can be han-
dled asynchronously, using receive definitions, and synchronously, using await
statements. A receive definition has the form receive m from p: stmt . It handles
un-handled messages that matchm from p, wherem and p are patterns. If match-
ing succeeds, unbound variables in m (and p) are bound to the corresponding
component of the message (and the message’s sender, respectively), and then stmt
is executed.
To synchronizemessage handling with local computation, receive handlers are
executed only at yield points. The programpoint before or after any statement can
5be declared as a yield point. In addition, there is an implicit yield point before each
await statement, for handling messages while waiting. By default, any number of
pending messages can be handled at a yield point.
An await statement has the form
await cond1 : stmt1 or ... or condk: stmtk timeout t: stmt
It waits until one of cond1 , ..., condk is true or time t has elapsed, and then non-
deterministically selects one of stmt1 , ..., stmtk , stmt whose condition is true and
executes the selected statement. Each branch is optional.
High-Level Queries for Synchronization Conditions. DistAlgo provides constructs
to express synchronization conditions in await statements as high-level queries
over message histories (or other sets or sequences). A query can be an existential
or universal quantification, a comprehension, or an aggregation. An existential
quantification has the form some v1 in s1, ..., vk in sk | cond . It returns true
iff cond holds for some combination of values of variables that satisfies all vi in si
clauses. Universal quantification is similar, with keyword each instead of some.
A comprehension has the form {e: v1 in s1, ..., vk in sk, cond}. It returns
the set of values of e for all combinations of values of variables that satisfy all
vi in si clauses and condition cond .
DistAlgo automatically maintains histories of messages sent and received by
each process in variables sent and received; they are automatically eliminated if
unused.
Configuration. Configuration for requirements such as use of logical clocks and
use of reliable and FIFO channels can be specified using DistAlgo’s configure
statement. For example, configure clock = Lamport specifies that Lamport’s log-
ical clocks are used; it configures sending and receiving of a message to update the
clock value, and defines a function logical_time() that returns the clock value.
3 Creating Variants using Incrementalization
Algorithm variants differ from each other due to different high-level invariants
they maintain and different ways of maintaining them. We describe the ideas of
transforming expensive queries into high-level invariants and using systematic in-
crementalization to generate efficient algorithms that maintain the query results
incrementally. Each resulting combination of ways of maintaining the invariants
forms an algorithm variant.
Example. Weuse as an exampleLamport’s algorithm for distributedmutual exclu-
sion, described in his seminal paper that proposed logical clocks [14]. The problem
is for multiple processes to access a shared resource mutually exclusively, in what
is called a critical section, i.e., there can be at most one process in a critical section
at a time.
Each process can be expressed in DistAlgo as in Figure 1 [24]. The process is
61 class P extends process:
2 def setup(s):
3 self.s := s # set of all other processes
4 self.q := {} # set of pending requests
5 def mutex(task):
6 self.t := logical_time() # request
7 send (’request’, t, self) to s #
8 q.add((’request’, t, self)) #
9 await each (’request’, t2, p2) in q
| (t2,p2) != (t,self) implies (t,self) < (t2,p2)
10 and each p2 in s | some (’ack’, t2, =p2) in received | t2 > t
11 task()
12 q.del((’request’, t, self)) # release
13 send (’release’, logical_time(), self) to s #
14 receive (’request’, t2, p2): # receive request
15 q.add((’request’, t2, p2)) #
16 send (’ack’, logical_time(), self) to p2 #
17 receive (’release’, _, p2): # receive release
18 for (’request’, t2, =p2) in q: #
19 q.del((’request’, t2, p2)) #
Fig. 1. Lamport’s algorithm (lines 6-19) plus setup in DistAlgo.
set up with sets s and q (lines 3-4). To run a task mutually exclusively, the process
sends a request and adds it to q (lines 6-8), waits for (i) own request (t,self) to
be before each other request (t2,p2) in q and (ii) having received an ack with a
time t2 later than t from each process p2 in s (lines 9-10) before doing the task in
critical section (line 11), and then removes the request from q and sends a release
(lines 12-13). When receiving a request or release, it sends back an ack and adds
to or removes from q (lines 14-19).
The two conditions in await are key to the algorithm to ensure mutual exclu-
sion, while the rest does basic sending and receiving of messages and bookkeeping
of q.
Incrementalization. Incrementalization transforms queries and updates to main-
tain high-level invariants, including invariants for intermediate and auxiliary val-
ues, incrementally [27,22,26,24]. It can yield diverse algorithms.
For the example in Figure 1, the two conditions in await are queries, consist-
ing of three quantifications including two that are nested; and assignments and
bookkeeping for s and q and implicitly adding to received at receive handlers are
updates.
The most direct algorithm can compute queries using iterations, in for-loops,
whereas an incremental algorithm can maintain the results of queries at updates
and look up the results as needed. An incrementalized algorithm maintains high-
level invariants not only for the query results but also for intermediate and auxil-
7iary values needed. Alternative invariants can often be used, yielding even greater
diversity.
For example, the condition on line 10 in Figure 1 can be transformed into
count {p2: p2 in s, (’ack’, t2, p2) in received, t2 > t} = count s
and then—with variables responded, number, and total holding the set value and
two count values, respectively, forming three invariants—transformed into:
number = total
Variable total is computed at set up of s, and responded and number at request,
and the following receive handler is added:
receive (’ack’, t2, p2): # new message handler
if t2 > t: # comparison in the condition
if p2 in s: # membership in the condition
if p2 not in responded: # test before adding
responded.add(p2) # add to responded
number +:= 1 # increment number
The resulting algorithm differs significantly from direct iteration for the nested
quantifications. The condition on line 10 could also be transformed into two nested
count queries, and the condition on line 9 can be transformed into a count query
also, or an aggregate query using min, yielding different algorithms for incremental
maintenance. Details of these transformations are in [24].
In general, incrementalization can also transform nested loops that compute
aggregate values such as sum and min [23,7,26]. For recursive functions as queries,
the resulting incremental algorithm can still use recursion, forming an optimized
recursive algorithm, or use iteration, forming an optimized iterative algorithm [20,26].
Additionally, more refined data structures can be used to implement sets more ef-
ficiently [3,10,26], such as using one bit for each process in the set responded above.
Incrementalization also enables new additional optimizations that are made pos-
sible as the results of systematic transformations [26].
4 Synchronized Execution for DistAlgo
A diversified process is a process with variants. A system may contain a mixture
of diversified and un-diversified processes. A gateway process is created for each
diversified process. It represents the variants of a diversified process to the rest
of the system, making them appear as a single process. The gateway intercepts
and forwards all inbound and outbound messages of all variants of the diversified
process. We focus on synchronization of DistAlgo constructs; other I/O events,
such as file accesses, can be synchronized using standard techniques.
Our synchronized execution framework consists of two parts: (1) an automated
program transformation that (1a) ensures all messages are routed via the gateway,
and (1b) inserts synchronization with the gateway at yield points, to ensure that
all variants have yielded the same number of times before handling their copies
8of a given inbound message, despite differences in message latency and process
execution speed; and (2) an algorithm run by the gateway that determines when
to forward messages and when to report divergence (i.e., differences in behav-
ior). When divergence is reported, the system may initiate application-specific
defensive action.
We first present the core version of this approach, which assumes all variants of
a process have the same communication pattern, i.e., send the samemessages to the
same destinations in the same order; we discuss later how to relax this assumption.
Handling Outbound Messages. To route outbound messages via the gateway, the
transformation replaces all calls to DistAlgo’s sendmethodwith calls to send_sync,
and it inserts a definition of that method in every process class. send_sync sends
the original message and its original destination to the gateway. Processes often
send their own process id in messages. Since each variant of a diversified process
has a unique process id, such messages will differ. To accommodate this as normal
behavior, not divergence, send_sync replaces all occurrences of the variant’s pro-
cess id in the message with the gateway’s process id. This also reflects the principle
that the gateway represents the variants to the rest of the system. Pragmatically,
it ensures that, if the recipient sends a reply to the process id contained in the
message, the reply goes to the gateway, as desired.
The gateway stores un-forwarded outbound messages received from each vari-
ant in a separate FIFO queue. When all of the queues are non-empty, it compares
the messages (including their destinations) at the heads of the queues. If they are
identical, the gateway dequeues the message from all queues and forwards one
copy to the destination, otherwise it reports divergence. To ensure liveness if some
divergent variant fails to send a message, once one queue becomes non-empty, the
gateway waits a limited amount of time for all queues to become non-empty; if
this time limit is exceeded, the gateway reports divergence.
Synchronization at Yield Points and await Statements. The transformation in-
serts a call to yield_sync(block, timeout) at every yield point, and it inserts a
definition of that method in every process class. The first argument block is a
boolean that indicates whether the yield point is associated with an await state-
ment. The second argument timeout , meaningful when the first argument is True,
is a timeout duration if the timeout clause is present in that await statement and
is None otherwise. The transformation also extends the setup method to initialize
a variable num_yields to zero. yield_sync increments num_yields, sends a yield
message containing block , timeout , and num_yields to the gateway and waits for a
yield-reply message from the gateway before returning.
The transformation for an await statement with timeout ensures the total wait
time is preserved, even though the waiting periodmay be split by interactions with
the gateway. It transforms await c1: s1 or . . . or ck : sk timeout t: s into
91 start_time = time.time()
2 while not (c1 or ... or ck):
3 elapsed = time.time() - start_time
4 remaining = t - elapsed
5 if remaining ≤ 0:
6 break
7 yield_sync(True, remaining)
8 if c1: s1
9 elif c2: s2
10 . . .
11 elif ck: sk
12 else s
If the await statement has no timeout, then lines 1, 3–6, and 12 are omitted, and
the second argument of yield_sync is None.
Handling Inbound Messages. When the gateway receives an inbound messagem,
it storesm in a queue of un-forwarded inboundmessages,waits until it has received
yield messages with the same num_yields from all variants, forwards to all variants
and dequeues all un-forwarded inbound messages, and then sends a yield-reply
message to all variants. The gateway communicates with the variants over FIFO
channels, so all variants handle the forwarded messages before proceeding from
the current yield point. In the copy ofm to be forwarded to variant p, the gateway
replaces all occurrences of its own process id with p’s process id.
If the gateway has received a yield message from all variants, and has no in-
bound message to forward to them, its behavior depends on the values of block and
timeout in the yield messages (if the values of block differ, or the values of timeout
differ by more than a small amount, divergence is reported). If block=False, the
gateway sends a yield-reply message to all variants, allowing them to proceed.
If block=True and timeout=None, the gateway waits until it has received and for-
warded an inbound message before sending a yield-reply message, since the condi-
tions in the await statementswill remain false until the variants’ states are updated
by handling of an inbound message. If block=True and timeout is a number, the
gateway behaves as in the previous sentence, except it will also send a yield-reply
message after time timeout has elapsed.
Process Creation. The program transformation reads a configuration file that
specifies which process types are diversified and the types of their variants. For
each diversified process type P , a gateway type GatewayP is generated (basically,
this is done by instantiating template code with the type P and the types of its
variants), and process creation statements with type P are transformed to create
instances of GatewayP instead. The setupmethod of GatewayP creates an instance
of each of the specified variant types, and passes the gateway’s process id to the
variants as an additional argument to their setupmethods, which are transformed
to accept this additional argument.
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Relaxed Synchronization. The above approach effectively introduces a barrier syn-
chronization for a diversified process’s variants at each synchronizationpoint. This
ensures the most timely detection of divergence. An alternative approach, used
in some other synchronized execution frameworks [13,33], is to allow one variant
(the “leader”) to get ahead, try to make the actions of the other processes (the
“followers”) consistent with the leader’s actions (e.g., by delivering the same num-
ber of messages at the corresponding yield event), and reporting divergence when
this is not possible. This may provide speedup but allows a divergent leader to
perform divergent actions before the leader’s divergence is detected; when this is
unacceptable, such actions should not be allowed to have externally visible effects
until the followers catch up and agree on the actions.
Allowing Differences in Message Pattern. It may be desirable to relax the require-
ment that corresponding messages sent by all variants of a process are identical,
in order to allow greater diversity. For example, Lamport’s distributed mutual
exclusion algorithm [14] sends in ack messages the current value of the sender’s
logical clock, whereas the variant in [17, Fig. 3] sends in ack messages the logical
time of the request being acknowledged. To support algorithm variants that have
the same communication pattern but different message content, we modify the
gateway to omit the equality check on outbound messages when the destination is
a diversified process, in which case the gateway sends to the other gateway an ar-
ray containing the message from each variant, which forwards each message in the
array to its corresponding variant. The correspondence is determined by indexing
variants in the order that their types are listed in the configuration file.
To support algorithm variants with different communication patterns, the con-
figurationfile can specify that certain types ofmessages are un-synchronized.When
the gateway receives a message of an un-synchronized type from its i’th variant, it
immediately forwards themessage to the destination’s gateway,which forwards the
message to its i’th variant. For example, for synchronized execution of Lamport’s
distributedmutual exclusion algorithmandRicart-Agrawala’s distributedmutual
exclusion algorithm [29], we specify that ack and release messages (used only in
Lamport’s algorithm) and response messages (used only in Ricart-Agrawala’s al-
gorithm) are un-synchronized; the gateway still synchronizes messages of other
types.
5 Diversity Metrics and Runtime Monitoring Tools
5.1 Code Diversity
Since diversity is the complement of similarity, we measure code diversity with a
well-established document similarity metric, namely, n-gram similarity with win-
nowing [31], which is used in the popular software plagiarism detection tool Moss
to measure similarity of program source code. We apply it to Python bytecode,
specifically, the sequence of bytecode instructions in a compiled program. Byte-
code similarity is more relevant than source-level similarity, because diversity at
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the Python level aims to increase resilience to flaws in the runtime system, and
bytecode is the program representation used by the runtime system.
An n-gram is a sequence of n consecutive instructions, starting at any position.
The algorithm computes the hash of every n-gram in the compiled program, and
then (for scalability) selects a subset of those hashes and stores them in a set called
the program’s fingerprint. The number of selected hashes is controlled indirectly
by an algorithm parameter w called the window size. A window of size w consists
of the hashes of w consecutive n-grams in the program. The winnowing algorithm
is guaranteed to select at least one hash from each window of size w, although it
may select more.
A robust metric should have the property that a slightly modified program has
high similarity to the original program. In Python bytecode, local variables and
global variables are identified by index. Inserting one new global variable at the
beginning of the program causes renumbering of all global variables; this could
make the metric non-robust. To ensure robustness, we normalize variable indices
within each n-gram: we re-index the first global variable accessed in the n-gram as
0, the second one as 1, etc., and similarly for local variables. For similar reasons,
we replace absolute line numbers used as targets in jump instructions with a place
holder.
We quantify code diversity (and similarity) of two programs as 1 minus the
Jaccard similarity of their fingerprints. Recall that the Jaccard similarity of sets
S and T is |S ∩ T |/|S ∪ T |. We use 1 minus Jaccard similarity so larger values
indicate greater diversity.
An alternative to n-gram similarity is Levenshtein distance (a.k.a. edit dis-
tance, namely, the minimum number of single-element insertions, deletions, and
substitutions needed to change one string to another) between the bytecode se-
quences in the compiled programs. Levenshtein distance is less suitable here, be-
cause it is sensitive to bytecode orderings in the compiled program that may be
unimportant at runtime. For example, permuting the order in which function def-
initions appear in the compiled program has no effect on the program’s runtime
behavior but has a large effect on the Levenshtein distance. Similarly, swapping the
branches in a conditional statement and negating the condition yields an equiva-
lent program with high n-gram similarity to the original but (if the branches are
large) a large Levenshtein distance from the original.
5.2 Trace Diversity
Trace diversity measures the similarity of the sequences of bytecode instructions
executed by two programs. Our bytecode-level tracing tool uses the standard
Python trace module to obtain a source-level trace, and then translates it to a
bytecode trace. A “blacklist” of modules to be ignored during the conversion can be
specified; in experiments, we blacklist some systemmodules, such as bootstrap and
trace. For each source line mentioned in the trace, identified by filename and line
number, the translator compiles that .py file to a .pyc file, loads the .pyc file using
the marshalmodule to obtain a code object, repeatedly uses the dis (disassembler)
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module to obtain the bytecode for the entire program as a list of Instruction ob-
jects, and uses the source line number information in the Instruction objects to
determine the sequence of instructions corresponding to each line of source code
in that file. In the traces to be compared, we include only the opcode and argument
attributes of each Instruction; other attributes (e.g., is_jump_target) are less im-
portant. We quantify similarity of two traces as the Levenshtein distance (edit
distance) between them divided by their average length, for normalization.
5.3 Input Access Diversity
Input access diversity measures the similarity of sequences of accesses to input
data by two programs, quantified as Levenshtein distance between the sequences
divided by their average length, for normalization. The core of the implementa-
tion is a general tool to intercept accesses to attributes of selected objects, by
overriding the __getattribute__ method of appropriate classes. In our use case,
the overridingmethod logs the access and then calls the original __getattribute__
method. For user-defined classes, this is easily accomplished by inserting a defi-
nition of __getattribute__ in the class. This approach does not work for built-in
types such as int, string, and tuple, which are common types of input data.
For each of these built-in classes, we define a new class, e.g. tracked_int for int,
that inherits from the built-in class and overrides the __getattribute__method. In
the remainder of the description, we focus on int; other built-in types are handled
similarly. The problem is that some accesses to attributes of tracked_int are not
logged, because attributes of built-in types are sometimes accessed directly by C
code in the CPython runtime system. For example, even if x is a tracked_int, the
addition operator in x+y compiles to the bytecode instruction BINARY_ADD, which
does not call __getattribute__ on either argument.
We overcome this problem by augmenting tracked_int to override all meth-
ods of int that access the integer value: __add__, __eq__, __le__, etc. If x is
a tracked_int, an expression like x+y now compiles to bytecode that uses the
CALL_FUNCTION instruction to explicitly invoke x’s __add__ method with argument
y. The tracked_int.__add__ method logs the access to the first argument (self),
calls __getattribute__ on the second argument (so the access to it will be logged,
if it is a tracked_int), and then calls the built-in __add__ method. Since we need
to override these operations anyway, we augment log entries to indicate which
operation was performed on the accessed attribute.
If x is an int, not a tracked_int, then CALL_FUNCTION invokes the built-in __add__
method, which is implemented by C code that accesses the second argument with-
out calling __getattribute__. Consequently, accesses to y are not logged, even if
y is a tracked_int. To overcome this remaining problem, we modify the program
to replace the remaining uses of int with a new class my_int, which inherits from
int and overrides each two-argument method of int with a method that calls
__getattribute__ on the second argument and then calls the original method. To
accomplish this replacement, we bind the name int to our class my_int, using the
assignment int = my_int. As a result, a constructor call such as int(1) returns an
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instance of my_int. The literal 1 still produces an int. Therefore, we transform the
source program to replace literals with constructor calls, e.g., 1 with int(1).
The remaining aspects of input access tracking differ for Python and Dis-
tAlgo. These aspects are (1) determining which objects are tracked, and (2) cre-
ating meaningful identifiers for tracked objects. We could easily use the result of
Python’s built-in id function to identify objects, but it would be difficult to com-
pare input access traces from different variants (or even different runs of the same
variant), because the object identifiers in them would be unrelated. Instead, we
create object identifiers that can be comparedmeaningfully with object identifiers
in other logs, as described below. The identifier is stored in an attribute of each
tracked object.
Python. For Python programs, the user specifies which objects should be tracked
by modifying the program to make them instances of tracked classes. For conve-
nience, our tracker class provides a method that recursively traverses an object
or collection (dictionary, list, tuple, or set) and replaces all instances of trackable
built-in types (i.e., types for which a corresponding tracked type exists) with in-
stances of tracked types. In our benchmark programs, inserting one or two calls to
this method suffices. Tracked objects are identified by a sequence number assigned
in the order that the objects are created. When tracked objects are used for data
read as input, these identifiers are meaningful across logs from different variants,
because the variants are given the same inputs and hence read the inputs in the
same order.
DistAlgo. For DistAlgo programs, all messages are automatically considered as
inputs; additional inputs, if any, are handled as described above for Python pro-
grams. Instances of trackable built-in types inmessages are automatically replaced
with instances of tracked types. Our tracker class, which inherits from DistAlgo’s
process class, is automatically inserted as a parent class of every process class
in the given program. It overrides process.send with a method that replaces all
instances of trackable built-in types in themessagewith instances of tracked types.
To create meaningful identifiers for tracked objects received in messages, we
observe that such an identifier should identify the message in which the object
was received. Our identifier for such an object is a tuple (host, procNum,msgNum,
objNum), where host is the host on which the sender is running, procNum identifies
the sending process relative to the host, msgNum identifies the message relative
to the sending process, and objNum identifies the object within the message.
To avoid dependence on standard process identifiers that cannot be mean-
ingfully compared across executions, we identify processes by a sequence num-
ber assigned in the order in which the processes are created. The tracker class
overrides process.setup with a method that assigns the process sequence number;
tracker.setup stores the next available process sequence number in a local file.ms-
gNum is a per-sender sequence number assigned in the order in whichmessages are
sent. The object sequence number objNum is assigned to each object in themessage
in the order that the object is encountered in a depth-first traversal of the message.
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Input access logs for DistAlgo programs also contain entries corresponding to
receive events, so we can determine that a particular data item (possibly received
in a previousmessage and stored in a data structure) was accessedwhile processing
a particular message.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated our approach on several sequential and distributed algorithms,
usingPython 3.7.2 andDistAlgo 1.1.0b13.Our software is available athttps://www.cs.stonybrook.edu/~stoller/software.
For each problem and each diversity metric, we measure the diversity achieved
(1) by algorithm diversity alone by averaging the diversity metric for each pair
of algorithms; (2) by implementation-level diversity (ILD) alone by averaging the
diversity metric for each pair of an algorithm and its ILD variant (i.e., the variant
obtained by applying ILD transformations to it); (3) by both forms of diversity
together by averaging the diversity metric for each pair of an algorithm and the
ILD variant of another algorithm. For code diversity, we used n = 5 (the value
used in [31]), and we disabled winnowing (i.e., included all hashes in the finger-
print), because the bytecode for our examples is not too large. Library code is not
included in our code diversity measurements.
Implementation-Level Diversity (ILD). We created ILD by applying these typi-
cal ILD transformations: (1) NOP insertion: after each line of code, insert a pass
statement with probability 0.05; (2) instruction reordering: for each two adjacent
independent lines of code, swap them with probability 0.5; (3) branch reorder-
ing: for each if-statement, swap the branches and negate the condition (if there
is no else branch, pretend else: pass is present) with probability 0.5; (4) func-
tion (including receive handler) reordering: for each two adjacent independent
def statements, swap them with probability 0.5; (5) argument reordering: for each
function (excluding run, setup, and receive handlers), swap the first two argu-
ments, swap the third and fourth arguments, etc.; (6) field reordering: reorder
the assignment statements that initialize the fields in each class, by swapping the
first two, the third and fourth, etc. Applying more complicated implementation-
level diversity techniques is future work; it will require significant effort, because
existing implementations of those techniques do not handle Python.
6.1 Sequential Algorithms
Our experiments use these algorithms for these problems: (1) graph reachabil-
ity: original (iterative) algorithm, incrementalized algorithm, and rule-based al-
gorithm (generated from rules using the method in [21]); (2) Hanoi Tower: original
recursive algorithm, optimized recursive algorithm, optimized iterative algorithm,
and optimized iterative algorithm with swap; (3) longest common subsequence
(LCS): original recursive algorithm, optimized recursive algorithm, and optimized
iterative algorithm; (4) pattern searching: naive algorithm, Knuth Morris Pratt
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Metric Level reach. Hanoi LCS pat. search. sort tree search Avg.
3 variants 4 variants 3 variants 3 variants 4 variants 6 variants
Code algo 0.80 0.58 0.65 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.74
Diversity impl 0.40 0.39 0.66 0.52 0.32 0.63 0.49
both 0.80 0.65 0.82 0.83 0.80 0.89 0.80
Input Access algo 1.04 0.54 0.58 0.28 0.77 0.35 0.59
Diversity impl 0 0.18 0.82 0.21 0 0 0.20
both 1.04 0.57 1.12 0.28 0.77 0.36 0.69
Trace algo 1.45 0.42 1.22 0.69 0.81 0.80 0.90
Diversity impl 0.05 0.30 0.60 0.23 0.11 0.14 0.23
both 1.45 0.45 1.39 0.70 0.82 0.82 0.94
Table 1. Experimental results for sequential algorithms. In the “Level” column, “algo”
and ”impl” denote algorithm and implementation-level diversity, respectively. The last
column contains averages.
(KMP) algorithm, Rabin Karp algorithm; (5) sorting: heap sort, quicksort, inser-
tion sort, and merge sort; (6) tree search: recursive and iterative algorithms for
AVL trees, recursive algorithm for B-trees, iterative algorithm for red-black trees,
and recursive and iterative algorithms for (unbalanced) binary search trees.
The results are in Table 1. We see from the last column that, for all three
metrics, algorithm diversity creates more diversity than ILD, and that the two
together create even more.
6.2 Distributed Algorithms
Our experiments use the following algorithms: (1) 2-phase commit (2PC); (2)
Hirschberg-Sinclair’s leader election (HSleader) [11]; (3) Lamport’s distributed
mutual exclusion (Lamutex) [14]; (4) Lamport’s basic Paxos [15]; (5) Ricart-
Agrawala’s distributed mutual exclusion (RAmutex) [29]. We used configurations
with 3 or 4 processes for each algorithm. There are two variants of each algorithm:
one variant that uses high-level queries over message histories, and one that ex-
plicitly maintains the result of those queries (and related intermediate results and
auxiliary values), updating them in assignment statements, especially in receive
handlers.
When measuring the dynamic metrics, we avoid spurious differences between
the variants due to the platform’s scheduling variability by running all variants in
parallel using synchronized execution (for programs other than 2PC, due to a bug
that we are still resolving in the interaction between our program transformations
for synchronized execution and input access tracing, when measuring input access
diversity, we instead avoided such spurious differences by running the variants sep-
arately but each with the same pattern of injected message delays that are larger
than the platform’s scheduling variability and designed to avoid races in message
delivery order).
The results are in Table 2. We see from the last column that, for all three met-
rics, algorithm diversity creates significantly more diversity than ILD. The trace
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Metric Level 2PC HSleader Lamutex Paxos RAmutex Average
Code algo 0.56 0.66 0.50 0.68 0.53 0.59
Diversity impl 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.30 0.27 0.21
both 0.59 0.68 0.53 0.68 0.54 0.60
Input Access algo 1.10 0.47 0.21 0.28 0.61 0.53
Diversity impl 0.08 0.04 0 0.03 0.17 0.06
both 1.09 0.52 0.21 0.30 0.61 0.55
Trace algo 0.20 0.35 0.13 0.54 0.21 0.29
Diversity impl 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.06
both 0.20 0.36 0.14 0.52 0.21 0.29
Table 2. Experimental results for distributed algorithms, with 2 variants for each
algorithm. In the “Level” column, “algo” and ”impl” denote algorithm diversity and
implementation-level diversity, respectively.
diversity produced by ILD is considerably smaller than the input access diversity
it creates. These results are not inconsistent, because both are measured as ra-
tios, and input accesses constitute a small fraction of the program’s full activity
recorded in the bytecode trace. The results for trace diversity for algorithm diver-
sity for distributed algorithms are notably smaller than for sequential algorithms,
because the trace includes execution of DistAlgo runtime library for networking,
which is not diversified.
7 Related Work
Existing techniques for automated software diversity, including all those surveyed
in [16], create implementation-level diversity, changing details of the implemen-
tation without changing the algorithm. Typically this is done by applying rela-
tively simple local transformations, like those used in our evaluation. There are
also some complex global transformations, such as instruction set randomization.
These transformations are fully automated and more easily applied to large pro-
grams, but they are limited in that they do not create algorithm diversity. For
example, they do not change the pattern in which inputs are used by the program.
Most work on automated software diversity for resilience transforms C pro-
grams or (disassembled) machine code, for broader applicability to systems code.
There is some work on automated diversity for programs in JIT-compiled high-
level languages, which diversifies the machine code generated by the JIT com-
piler. For example, librando does this for Java and JavaScript [12], and INSeRT
does this for JavaScript [32]. This low-level approach is suitable for creating
implementation-level diversity. Our methodology diversifies the high-level pro-
gram directly to create algorithm diversity.
InN -version programming [1],N versions of a system (or component) are cre-
ated by separate and independentmanual design and implementation efforts start-
ing from the same requirements specification, and the versions are run in parallel
with synchronized execution. The goal is resilience in the presence of design faults,
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since independent teams are less likely to make the same design mistakes. Our
work, like other work on software diversity, aims to mitigate software vulnerabili-
ties, not design errors. The two techniques could be used together to address both.
N -versionprogrammingmay introduce algorithmdiversity, but not in a controlled
way, and at the cost of significant manual effort. In contrast, our approach is to
create variants using a programtransformation and optimizationmethod based on
systematic incrementalization, which guides the process, helps control how much
diversity is introduced, and helps ensure correctness compared to ad-hoc devel-
opment of variants. Our program transformation system InvTS [19,9] provides
semi-automated support for the method, significantly reducing manual effort.
Synchronized execution has been widely studied in the fault-tolerance commu-
nity, where it is often calledN -version execution.N -version execution frameworks
typically work at the system-call level, so they can be applied to software running
on a given operating system, regardless of the application programming language.
Our synchronized execution framework is applicable only to applications written
in DistAlgo, but it is more portable and lighter weight. It can be used on any OS
supported by DistAlgo (Windows, macOS, Linux, and Android), while system-
call based approaches are highly OS-specific, e.g., Varan [13] and Bunshin [33] are
N -version execution frameworks for Ubuntu. It is lighter-weight because a single
high-level synchronization event is typically implemented bymultiple system calls.
7.1 Evaluation of Diversity Techniques
A few approaches are commonly used to evaluate implementation-level diversity
techniques. One is to estimate the probability of a successful memory-related ex-
ploit (e.g., buffer overflow or format string attack) based on the information about
the diversified program that the attacker would need to guess, more specifically,
the type of information (e.g., the address of a specific object, or the difference
between the addresses of two specific objects) and the number of possible values of
that type of information due to the randomization in the diversity transformation.
This approach is used in, e.g., [2,8].
Diversity techniques designed specifically to defend against ROP attacks are
typically evaluated using a coverage metric that measures the fraction of ROP
gadgets re-located by the transformation, and sometimes also an entropy metric
that measures the number of possible new positions of the ROP gadgets, reflecting
the probability of the attacker correctly guessing the new locations. This approach
is used in, e.g., [28,12]).
These approaches based on specific vulnerabilities in low-level languages are
unsuitable for evaluating diversity for interpreted languages, such as Java and
Python.
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